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CONGRESSIONAL HUNGER CENTER
Strengthening United Nations Human Rights Efforts in Rwanda!Bunmdi
Progress Report, Number Three
February 24, 1995

The Congressional Hunger Center (CHC), in support of the human rights concerns ofits
Chairman, Congressman Tony P. Hall, conducted another mission to Rwanda, Burundi
and Geneva during the period February 5-14, 1995. This is part ofthe CHC's continuing
effort, supported by the Reebok Foundation and several nongovernmental organizations,
to facilitate the unprecedented deployment of United Nations human rights monitors to
Rwanda. CHC staff confinned the following finctings and recommendations:
I. The Human Rights Field Office, Rwandn (HRFOR) Becomes Fully Operational

A Einding
In sharp contrast to their findings in November, 1994, CHC staff on this visit found a
functioning field office ofHRFOR in Kigali, and an increasingly effective team of
approximately 100 of the total l47 UN human rights monitors approved for deployment in
Rwanda. Monitors at most field sites are performing all the organic human rights
functions required in Rwanda, ie., monitoring current abuses in both public and private
sectors; conducting genocide investigations; and pto"Yiding technical cQoperation and
advice in administration ofjustice. Alteady HRFOR is commencing a vital, perhaps the
most definitive, and certainly the most cost-effective, impact on recovecy and nationbuilding in Rwanda. Staffing, structure and leadership in the Kigali office have
strengthened remarkably over the past two months. To be sure, European/African regional
tensions have emerged in the Kigali office. Geneva is aware of these tensions and is taking
pains to clarify job descriptions of senior officials to reduce misunderstandings.
B. Recommendation
Progress Illade by the Office Director Bill Clarance needs to be acknowledged and fully
supported by the NGO and governmental comm.unities. Clara.nce should be pro·vided the
security of a longer-term appointment, at least to the end of the 1995 calendar year. The
Geneva headquarters must underline with Clarance's deputy the agreed division oflabor,
i.e., that the deputy will concentrate primarily on administrative, logistics and operational
support matters (while being the alter ego in Clarll.Ilce's absence)-- thus freeing Clarance
to do what he does best, i.e., field operations. It is still very early in the operation to be
able to place the HRFOR completely on auto-pilot. In the absence of adequate supporting
adVisory and facilitating seJ:Yices from. other UN agencies (whose mandate it is to assure
that all the pieces are in place for a successful hUlllall.itarian operation), the Congressional
Hunger Center will need to continue filling this gap over the next several weeks.
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D.. The Human Rights Program in Rwanda Starts to get Respect
A Finding

Human rights field monitors get respect and perf'onnance from local civilian and military
officials to the extent that the monitors establish productive relationships and add value to
the Rwandan nation-bullding task. The more mature human rights staff are succeeding in
establishing such relationships and in developing constructive partnerships with the Army,
(RPA), gendarmerie, magistrates and local government officials. Recognition and respect
from. fellow UN agencies is always the hardest for a new ''guy on the UN block., to come
by. Yet the negative comments seem to be do'Wll sharply .from the CHC November visit
and hints of positive UN acceptance in the UN fanilly are appearing in some quarters.
Thls improved HRFOR professionalism and performance are due in no small measure to
CHC's persistent advocacy and facilitation of I) Participatory preparedness training;
2)Tougher, more realistic recruiting criteria; 3) Matching people deployments more
closely with the vehicular and logistics deployments essential for mobility in the field; and
4) SuppQrt to an operationally oriented office structure for HRFOR, Rwanda. CHC
pressed for, and saw the HCHR achieve, the same standards for selection, trainfug and
deployment of the European Union (EU) monitors as for the monitors from other sources
(the EU monitors are just now in the process ofbeconling an organic part of the UN
Rwandan operation).
B. Reeomrr.<mdatiou.
CHC must conrlnue to work to maintain the rigorous standards for personal recruitment,
and to weed out those ,...,·ho prove to be unfit; to improve the standards for the
participatory training workshops (especially, get rid of the dry lectures); to assure full
integration of the EU monitors under Bill Clarance's leadership; to insist on frequent :flow
of substantive operational information to interested UN member states (especially to
donor states); and to help facilitate 11ubUo information on this extraordinazy example of
impacting people protection and nation·building in a failed state.

m. BRFOR Tailors its Operation to Needs on the Ground
A. finding
In Southeast Rwanda (the Kibungo area where a high Tutsi concentration existed

pre-Apri16, 1994) revenge killings, arbitrary arrests and tonure by renegade soldiers and
abusive local officials, have driven HRFOR into an intensive sutveillance operation. Bill
Clarance invented it and dubbed it utactical monitoring.,. This creative effort is getting top
government attention and suppon in Kigali. It seems to offet the best way to modify
and/or stop the pattern of local abuses in perhaps the most dangerous quarter of Rwanda.
HRFOR is going to the so~ of the on-going abuses that were first documented in the
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Gersony assessment commissioned by the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCll) in
late summer 1994.
While HRFOR performs the other functions of its holistic mandate, including
genocide investigation and technical cooperation in the Southeast as well, it is able to
concentrate on these more acceptable sectors (to the Rwandan government) in such
regions as Cyangugu alongside Lake Kivu in the Southwest. Here local civilian and
militai}' officials, together \vith the populace, receive human rights education iu the
schools; technical advisory services in administration ofjustice (helping on the caseload of
over 20,000 prisoners in deplorable states of detention), and investigation of the honific
acts of genocide that occurred post-Apri16, in the Cyangugu area. Such welcome and
positive contn"butions make the less palatable pill of current abu~ monitoring easier to
swallow.
The UN human rights team in Cyangugu has had extraordinary success in
cultivating professional and constructive relationships with local civilian and milita:ry
officials. The more hopeful cli.tnate for human rights also owes a great deal to the
Cyangugu Prefect; he is a graduate in human rights from the University ofLyon and is a
major reason for the acceptance and success of the UN's holistic human rights efForts in
that region.
B. B.ecommendation
The creative "tactical monitoring" initiative must be acknowledged (as a major
innovation by the HRFOR Dkector Bill Clarance) and supported by both the host
government and intemational community. The holistic package ofhuman rights service~
which can be administered in most of the rest of Rwanda, must be viewed as both orgauic
and essential to the continued effectiveness of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
This holistic approach must be recognized as a sine qua non for all future human rights
field operations, e.g., in Burundi. The UN Development Program (UNDP) needs to
support this .function as an integral pan of the HCH'R's mandate and play an active
fundraising role through Round Table donor conferences to enable the HCHR. to
discharge this mainstream component of his responsibilities.
IV. Human Rights Headquarters in Geneva Must Catch up with its Operational
Culture in the Field

A. Finding
There is now a mentali~ and a developing Wture for human rights operations in
the field. It is in Rwanda today; it must be in Burundi tomorrow; and it will be required in
conjunction with all too many other current, and future, complex humanitarian
emergencies. But for the Rwanda operation to maintain momentwn and succeed, for a
Burundi operation to make an impact, indeed, for the future viability of the veey Office of
the High Commissioner itsel( the HCHR must personally devote himself to the rapid
development of both au operational culture and capaci~ within his immediate office in
Geneva. (The immediate office of the new UN High Commissioner for Human rights is
very small, understandably lacks an operational capability at this point, and must rely on
the latgert legal papexwork-oriented Human Rights Center in Geneva for operational
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backup required for Rwanda. Mr. Mautner-Markhofofthe Center is doing a herculeanjob
in providing this support. His considerable skills could be leveraged greatly, however, ifhe
were part of an augmented operational task force organic to the Office of the High
Commissioner.) Failw'e or delay in developing this capacity in the High Commissioner's
office effectively jeopardizes the Rwanda and Burundi operations. It may also place in
question the very future of maintaining a Human Rights High Commissioner in the United
Nations.

B RecommMdation
While High Commissioner Ayala-Lasso indicated in a meeting with CHC
Executive Director Gene Dewey on February 13, that he might need to sweep an
operational capability into his own office for Rwanda, he still hoped to be able to mount
future field operations out of the Human Rights Center in Geneva {in pan because oftwf
concerns within the Center itself). Dewey told him, in effect, that there just was not time
for the Center to shift gears from a radically different secretariat role to an operatiQDal
field sup.pon role. US officials in Washington and Geneva must continually reinforce the
imperative for an organic, holistic, human rights operational capability in Ayala-Lasso's
immediate office. And the international humanitarian system -- NGOs, UN agencies, an.d
serious UN member states need to accept, and support the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights as the fotnth (in addition to UNHCR, UNICEF and
WFP), and fully, operational agency in the UN humanitarian constellation.
V. The Rwandan Government Needs Credit for Human Rights Progress, per se, and
to Reinforce ~lore Positive Performance "''here its Record is Still Weak
A. Finding

There is commendable discipline and significant human rights progress on the pan
of senior Rwandan government officials in Kigali -- especially Vice President and Defense
Minister I<agame. But Kagame. along with some other senior officials, tends to regard the
current abuse monitoring role of:H:RFOR as a vote of no-confidence in the ability of the
govemm.ent to protect its ovm citizens. There is insufficient feedback, crediting him with
doing good things, to counteract his negative perception of the UN hwnan rights e.ffotts
Recommendation

Visitors to Kagame, and to other senior Rwandan offi~ials probably need to
overcorrect a bit by acknowledging the RPFs statesmanship in accepting UN human rights
monitors and in taking on the less palatable aspects {i.e. the HRFOR upolicing" function
VYith respect to cunent abuses) along with those the RPF welcomes (accountability for
genocide and technical cooperation). CHC staff recommended to HCHR, and he
accepted, the idea of making field visits on his next Rwanda trip (probably around March
10) in the company of Vice President Kagam.e. They would visit the weak spots in the
Southeast where the vice president and HCHR could see together the problem of abusive
local officials and the need for tactical monitoring. HCHR would be able to commend,
and reinforce, Kagam.e's action in dealing with these officials (he claims to have fired some
of them). In the Southwest (Cyangugu area) they would see together the difference that
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cooperative officials make. and the major contnbutions HRFOR is making, to confidence
and nation-building in Rwanda. Such steps could contribute to a self..fultiUing prophecy in
terms of continued improvements in official Rwandan behavior.
VI. Internal Strengthening of Some 1JN Agencies (Especially DHA), and Mutual
Reinfor~ement From Others (UNDP) are Essential to Effective UN Human Rights
Field Operations.
A Internal Strengthen1ng ... the UN Department ofHumanitarian Affairs (DHA)
1. Findings
DHA's intended function is not to D.Ul, or even coordinate, complex: humanitarian
operations. UN member states (with strong support in the US Congress from

Representative Tony Hall) created DHA in 1992 to facilitatJ: iutemational humanitarian
operations -- whether emergency relief; or human rights -- and make SUCIJhey go well.
As suc:h, DHA is the agency accountable -- to the Secretary General, to UN members and
emergency victims-- for how well, and how poorly, an operation goes. Yet, UN member
states have not supported, or insisted sufficiently on the imperative for DHA to organize
and staff itself to assure that such vital field operations as the Rwanda human rights
monitor deployment go well. Largely because of this lack of follow-through by member
states which created D~ the Congressional Hunger Center faced up to the need to help
fill this gap for the Rwandan human rights operation. Because the office of the HCHR. was
so new and inexperienced, "value-added" from outside was needed to help assure
yebjc;ula( and logistical deployments matched people deployments to Rwanda; HCHR
needed_assistance in qualicygersonucl selection and in f1Uality readin~s training of field
monitors; and above all, it needed dedicat~d fundrajsing eftbas to se~e adequate
financial support through the UN's consolidated appeal process. The Congressional
Hunger Center is helping with this stop-gap role, pending development of such a capacity
within the UN itself

2. Recommendation
The Congressional Hunger Center is prepated to continue its operational support
role to UN humanitarian operations, provided sufficient private funding becomes available.
The longer term solution, however, is to tl.esh out this capacity within the UN Department
of Humanitarian Affairs. Since DHA is already a major agenda item for the summer
session of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in Geneva, the Rwanda
human rights deployment o.ffers a classic example of the kind ofhumanitarlan operation
DHA was created to facilitate. The US Delegation to ECOSOC should build on this
examplet recall the DHA strengthening plan (the Dewey "Get-Well" proposal) the US
Govetnnlent pushed in the 1993 ECOSOC session, and·develop support in the 1995
ECOSOC meeting to achieve reforms and strengthening which would enable DHA to
perfonn fully its intended facilitating role in future human rights deployments (e.g., a
preventive deployment to Burundi) and other major field operations.
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B Mumal Reinforcement ... The UN Development PrQII'm (UNDP)

J. Findings
Technical cooperation for administrati-ve ofjustice is a central, organic feature of
the UNHCHR.'s holistic human rights operation in Rwanda. The UN Development
Program (UNDP), in its responsibilities to oversee the Round Table fundraising process
for Rwanda, has a unique opportunity to reinforce the HCHR's primacy in implementing
technical cooperation in human rights for R.wanda. UNDP also needs to lobby for the

HCHR -- both in the Round Table meetings and mthe DHA Consolidated Appeals --to
work with key donor states to assure fWl funding for the modest human rights cost

components in HCHR.•s Rwanda programs.

2.Reconunendadon
The US should develop a consensus among key UNDP govemiug council
members to assure full UNDP suppntt, especially financial support, to the UNHCHR in
implementing this core program .in Rwanda. Similarly, the US needs to press for support
from both DHA and UNDP for adequate funding for an immediate preventive human
rights monitQ[ deployment to Burundi.
For the High Commissioner's upcoming visit to Rwanda, it is important that he
receive an invitation from the Rwandan govenunent, stressing the importance of the
HCHR using the visit to articulate and accelerate his already developed plan of action as
· agentor
fl teehnzca
· t cooperatJOU
· tn
• Le
h a dmmJstrattan
• ·
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r· ·
the UN executtve

vn. The High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights Need to Share
Information

A

Fjpding

Information on root causes for refugees fleeing Rwanda, and refusing to renun to
Rwanda, is vitally important to human rights teams in implementing tech.uical assistance
programs and building confidence inside Rwanda. UNHCR field staffin Zaire have
already contacted UNHCHR staff across Lake Kivu in Cyangugu, suggesting that they
determine root cause through direct iutervie\VS in the Zaire (Bukaw) camps.. Geneva
human rights headquarters cwrently holds that its staff can only work in Rwanda,
UNHCR, meanwhile has not received, and/or not responded to any requeSt to share this
''root cause" information obtained by its protection officers in Zaire, Bwundi and Tanzania
camps.
B. Recommendation

CHC staff raised the problem with IVIr. Mautner-Markhof at the Human Rights
Center on February 13. ?vlautner-Markhofagreed to look into the possibilities ofjoint
UNHCRIUNHCHR teams interviewing in the first asylum camps, so as to get around the
problem of operating unilaterally outside Rwanda.
Similarly, a request needs to go to the High Commissioner for Refugees to have
her regional coordinator, CaiToll Faubert~ share agreed essential elements of information
on a regular, freq11:ent basis \\ith Bill Clarance in Kigali.

t.
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vm. An Historic Window is Open, Albeit Briefly, for a Preventive Deployment of
Human Rights ~looitors in Burundi
A.

Eindinis

Burundi is already far doWn the slippery slope to a Rwanda-like apocalypse. The
country is an armed camp -- with machetes and Kalashnikofs at the ready (and too many
of them already in. use, even as you read this) at every level ofHutu and Tutsi society.
Both the American ambassador and the Secretary General's special representative, have
threats on their lives for trying to get at the truth of atrocities already occurring. Killings
and severe human rights abuses are a daily, and nightly, way oflife. Yet Burundi's
President believes there is still time to help Vvith history's first-ever preventive deploymev.t
of human rights monitors. The committed, but fragile UN Human_ Rights Office in
Bujumbura joins the Burundi President in this desperate appeal for monitors to provide a
presence throughout the Burundi countryside. The President's office appealed to CHC's
executive director Dewey on February 11 for help in formulating and implementing such
an unprecedented request. Dewey agreed to help, and suggested that the President's
Special Assistant also insure that the President's speech to the UNHCR/OAU-sponsored
Refugee Conference in Bujumbura on February 15 include a call for this human rights
presence. This was done. Dewey further relayed this request and challenge to the Bunmdi,
and US, permanent representatives to the UN in Geneva, to the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights, and to key contacts on the National Security CoU1lcil staff and the
Human Rights Bureau of the State Department.
B B.ecpmmendatiOJlS

Again, here is a gap and an apparent need for someone outside the formal UN
strucrure to perform the DHA-type legwork of making this human rights presence in
Burundi a reality. This historic preventive deployment should be facilitated through the
following three-track approach:
·
1. Arrange for the formal request to be drafted from the President ofBunm~ to
be relayed through the High Commissioner for Human Rights (with a copy to the
Sectetary-Generat•s Special Representative in BUlUlldi) to the UN Secretary-General.
(CHC staff requested the Human Rights Officer in Bujumbura to work with the assistant
to the president, Kavakourie, who is the former ambassador to Waslrlngto~ to draft and
dispatch this formal request).
2. Press for early introduction and passage in the current session ofthe UN Human
Rights Commissioner in Geneva a resolution calling for inlmediate funding for, and
deplo}ment ot; a preventive human rights monitoring effort throughout the entire country

of Burundi (CHC staff received encouragement for this idea .from Political Counsellor
Peter Eichert at the US Mission, Geneva. CHC's executive director requested the Burundi
permanent representative in Geneva to work with Eichert and other mends o£Bumndi to
bring this about. Key contacts in Washington Y~·ere urged to include instructions
supponing this plan to the US Delegation to the current session of the UN Human rights

Commission in Geneva.).
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3. Organize, with State Department's Human Rights Buteau and like-minded
legislators a joint executive/legislative lobbying effort with UN member states of the
Human Rights Commission ·- both to pass the preventive deployment resolution, and to
connnit .fimcling, on a hlgh priority basis, for early implementation on the ground. Parallel
efforts must be made with the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the UN
Peacekeeping Department to factor into the hUDWJ. rights deployment package a workable
security component for the monitors, since threats to such a presence are tar greater in
Burundi than in Rwanda. These efforts could well be the most .lmpottant, and costeffective, investments that the US goveilliXleot, the UN Human Rights Commission, and
indeed the international community as a whole, could make in the next four weeks.

